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In China, the urban–rural dual structure of land market has resulted in urban sprawl caused by
industrial diffusion. Urban sprawl disintegrated agricultural communities in suburbs, thereby
increasing the unemployment rate among farmers who lost their lands. To address this problem,
the Chinese government proposed a reform program to analyze the monopoly of the
government in the land market and guarantee the property rights of farmers.
This study analyzed the connection between land market mechanism and suburban space
formation. Results concluded that the current land transfer system caused industrial urban
sprawl, and the reform program may promote the urban sprawl of population. Two typical
models of rural land development were studied. A model called land cooperatives based on land
pooling joint stock system was proposed to build a compact and sustainable suburban space.
& 2016 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Since the 1980s, China's economy has experienced rapid
development with fast urbanization. During urbanization,.09.002
ction and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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chitectural Research (2016), httpthe input of land resources functions as one of the key
driving factors.
According to China's Constitution, urban land is state-
owned and rural land is owned by the village collective.
Furthermore, rural land can be requisitioned by the govern-
ment for public interest. In eastern China, urban land is
almost exhausted, so local authorities have begun to abuse
the power of land requisition. They mostly gain the land
of villages without fair compensation but sold at the
market price.
In the last decade, the wave of economic development
zone construction in suburban areas, satellite cities, and
campus cities spread across China. However, the density ofThis is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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S. Dang et al.2these newly urbanized districts is relatively low. A study
with 160 national economic development zones in China
showed that the average building coverage ratio is 13.91%,
and the average plot ration is only 0.43 (Pan, 2005).
Except for the spatial effect, farmers within the area of
urban expansion have to adapt to a new lifestyle without
farmland to become citizens. This upheaval can cause many
social problems, such as unemployment and crime, which
are also consequences of the disintegration of traditional
communities.
The Chinese Central Government found that urbanization
has encroached the interests of farmers, and a reform
program is currently on the agenda to ensure the property
rights of farmers. This radical change will have a far-
reaching inﬂuence on suburban space in China.1.2. Related work
With regard to Chinese village community research, Fei
Xiaotong and Huang Zongzhi perceived Chinese villages as
comprehensible social and economic community units. In
recent years, some scholars studied those villages involved
in passive or spontaneous industrialization and urbanization,
and they reported the concept of village community recon-
stitution (Wang and Yan, 1990; Zhe and Chen, 2000; Lan,
2005; Li, 2010). Zhou (1995) considered the structural
transition of Chinese villages as a result of studying the
allocation of residual rights of rural land. Both Yang (2005)
and Dong and Ren (2009) summarized the current patterns
of rural land transfer and evaluated their efﬁciency. They
believed that land pooling and market agency are prefer-
able choices for rural land transfer. In the ﬁeld of Chinese
urban sprawl research, Hong and Zhang (2012) system-
atically studied the institutional factors that caused the
overexpansion of Chinese cities. Li and Qu (2012) inter-
connected the increment of China's GDP and the growth of
urban built-up area and proposed a positive correlation
between them.
Since the implementation of the reform program, no
research has compared the spatial and social effects of the
current and anticipated land transfer institution. This paper
proposes a mechanism of rural land development based on
the comparative study of practical models to build quality
and healthy urban–rural space under land transfer reform.Figure 1 Dual-structural Land Transfer System.2. Current land market institution and its
spatial effect
2.1. Dynamic model of urban density
determination
In the mathematically abstracted single-center city, indica-
tors such as price of houses, density of capital, price of
land, and density of population decline with increasing
distance to the city center (Ding, 2005). When the devel-
opment of the single-center city is divided into three
stages, an updated model can be achieved (Figure 2).
In the second stage, the land near the boundary of the
primarily developed area is expensive, so it has a high
density. In the third stage, the development of an externalPlease cite this article as: Dang, S., et al., Land cooperatives as an app
land transfer market. Frontiers of Architectural Research (2016), httparea follows the mode of the second stage. Redevelopment
becomes proﬁtable with increasing land price in the city
center (Ding, 2005).2.2. Current land transfer market system
Figure 1 illustrates the operational mechanism of the
current land circulation system. The local government is
the only land supplier, so rural land must be levied before it
is sold to enterprises or assigned to state-run institutions or
companies. In the urban land market, state-run enterprises
and institutions may obtain land by distribution, whereas
non-public economic organizations must pay for it.
Within villages, the legal land market does not exist.
Farmers are allowed to subcontract farmland to another
community member or an agricultural organization, but
none of them can change the land use.
The austerity policy of land supply increases the price of
urban land and gives birth to the black market of land
transfer. Illegal land trading shows the eagerness of land-
owners to obtain proﬁt from their usufruct. Local autho-
rities usually ignore black market transactions so that the
interests of both sides can hardly be admitted in court.
The main character of the current land transfer market
system is the government monopoly of primary land market.
Rather than citizens, farmers are actual land managers, but
they are excluded from land transfer activities. Even as the
legal land owner, the village collective is forbidden to sellroach of suburban space construction: Under the reform of Chinese
://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foar.2016.09.002
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current suburban space.
2.3. Model modiﬁcation under institutional
constraints
The model can be modiﬁed, considering the effect of land
supply institute (Figure 3). Taking advantage of the double-
track price system of urban land supply, institutions can gain
urban land from the local government for free (Figure 1);
therefore, the density of institutionally used land, such as
government ofﬁce, state-run enterprise, university, and
military organization, is considerably lower than the aver-
age level of commercial development. Consequently, the
total density of the ﬁrst stage of development is lower than
that of the dynamic model.
During the second stage, the growth of city population
increases the house demand. Land is not fully developed in
the ﬁrst stage, so the investors use more parcels of land.
However, the limitation of rural land transfer reduces the
amount of available land. Therefore, the city developers
should increase density to satisfy the growing house
demand. In distant areas, house price is higher than its
actual value because of the lack of infrastructure and public
service.
In the third stage, the low-density city center fully
occupied with institutions is attractive for developers. As
land price continues to increase, many institutions move to
rural areas so that the city center can be redeveloped.Figure 2 Dynamic model of urban density determination
(Ding, 2005).
Figure 3 Dynamic model of urban density determination with
Instit.
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use more rural lands because of the low price. Such use of
rural land is one of the main characteristics of suburban
space in China. Many scholars used the conception of urban
sprawl to describe this phenomenon.
3. Reform program and its anticipated spatial
effect
3.1. Operational mechanism of uniﬁed urban–
rural land market
Figure 4 illustrates the operational mechanism of uniﬁed
urban–rural land market. The role of the government will be
changed from the controller of land transfer to the land
market regulator. Compared with the current system
(Figure 1), most land transfer activities will be conducted
by market economy. Farmers shall be able to use their
land fully.
Furthermore, a set of policy means will be applied to
compensate for the defects of market operation, thereby
ensuring the realization of public interest and social equity.
3.2. Anticipated spatial effect of the reform
program
3.2.1. Motivating factors of urban sprawl
The popularization of private cars and television sets,
development of main roads, and preference of courtyard
houses caused the urban sprawl in the United States. The
desire of citizens to live in houses with intimate courtyards
and good natural environment is restrained by monopolized
land supply.Figure 4 Uniﬁed land transfer system.
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S. Dang et al.4However, when the transfer of rural family homestead is
permitted, citizens with strong purchasing power and who
live in overdeveloped high-rise collective houses, speciﬁ-
cally those without adequate public product supply
(Figure 3, Stage 2), will urgently escape from the city and
spread to the vast countryside.
3.2.2. Inhibitory factors of urban sprawl
If the property right of each individual farmer is well
protected, the current method of land requisition will
occupy a large amount of time to reach an agreement with
each land owner. Land transferor can be paid directly by
selling homestead to an individual buyer; the buyer who
wants more parcels of land will increase his/her bid.
Therefore, high expense will restrain the current urban
sprawl pattern.
Notably, the abolishment of a double-track price system
will encourage institutions and state-run enterprises to fully
use the land they paid with a ﬁnancial grant.
The reduced supply of large-scale rural land will encou-
rage investors to use a large amount of capital and less land,
thereby making the development of suburbs compact.
3.2.3. Comprehensive evaluation
The reform program means that future suburban rural land
development will be driven by individual consumption
rather than industry investment. Trading of single home-
stead will be allowed to realize the property rights, but
fragmented land supply should be limited for the intensive
use of land resources (Table 1).
4. Comparative study of two innovative
approaches of urbanization: Huaming and
Nanhai models
4.1. Government-led Suburb development:
Huaming model
4.1.1. Introduction
In recent years, many Chinese local authorities began to
innovate rural land transfer pattern. The most inﬂuential
method was the Exchange Homestead for House policy
designed and carried out by Tianjin in the project ofTable 1 Comprehensive evaluation.
Land user Motivating factors
Urban middle class families Fragmented land supply
Better Environment
Industrial Diffusion
Cheap Commuting Cost
Lower Crime Rate
The development of Internet
Institutions Higher Land Price in City Cente
Enterprises Preferential Policies Provided b
Urban Developers Cheaper Laboratory
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Jiulongpo, Chongqing, Jiaxing, and Zhejiang.
Exchange Homestead for House means farmers can give
up their property rights of homestead. In return, they can
move into apartments in a new town. Until the end of 2008,
over 100,000 farmers moved into new towns.
The policy initially aimed to conglomerate the settlement
of villagers mainly by heightening the density of residence
so that saved land could be reclaimed or commercially
developed. This paper deemed such an approach as
government-led suburban development.
Huaming Town belongs to Dongli District, Tianjin. It is
located to the east of Tianjin outer ring road and north of
Tianjin Binhai international airport and its accessory indus-
trial park. The Tianjin Hangu Road, which connects Tianjin
downtown with Binhai New Area, is across Huaming Town
area. These locational factors all promote land value
(Figure 5).4.1.2. Exchanging rules and supporting policies
During the implementation of the Exchanging Homestead
for House policy, the houses rather than homestead were
calculated for exchange. According to the detailed rules of
the government, 1 m2 of a farmer's main house converts to
equal ﬂoor space in Huaming new town, and 1 m2 of
auxiliary house is equivalent to 0.5 m2 of ﬂoor space. The
courtyard is not included. For example, considering a family
with 1 mu (1 mu is approximately equal to 667 m2) home-
stead, on which a 60 m2 main house and 40 m2 accessory
house are established, the family may obtain a set of 90 m2
apartment if they will move into a new town. If the
apartment is more than 90 m2, the family must pay for
the extra area at market price.
The local government also made some policies to help
farmers who lost their homestead. These policies included
public production provision, social security provision, free
occupational education, free technical training, and job
recommendation.4.1.3. Integrated evaluation of Huaming model
The volume ratio of Huaming new town is 0.75, which is
lower than the average urban volume ratio (0.8–1.0).
However, considering the condition that each village ofInhibitory factors
Unacquainted Local Community
Lack of Public Good
Limited Construction Land Stock
r Fragmented Land Supply
The Abolishment of Double Track Price Systemy Govt
Higher Rural Land Price
Longer Developing Cycle
roach of suburban space construction: Under the reform of Chinese
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Figure 5 Huaming new town project.
5Land cooperatives as an approach of suburban space construction: Under the reform of Chinese land transfer marketHuaming town is to be developed separately, the Huaming
new town is successive in compactness.
Farmers were the least to beneﬁt after the calculation of
gains and losses of the participants of such an experiment.
The problem was the unbalanced land increment allocation.
For example, in Guanzhuang village, farmers owned a total
of 142.8 ha homestead land, which was about 749 m2 per
family. However, each family only gained 75 m2 new house,
which was worth 300,000 yuan at market price. According to
ofﬁcial data, the average income of land transfer was 15
million yuan per hectare, which demonstrated that each
homestead of Guanzhuang village families was worth
approximately 1.2 million. More than 75% of land increment
was taken by the local government. Farmers did not only
have to bear with direct economic loss, but they could
hardly engage in agricultural production because of resi-
dential migration. The change in career created difﬁculty
for farmers to obtain a job after moving into new towns.
Urbanization, speciﬁcally the non-agriculturalization of
farmers, is a long-term event in most countries. The
transformation from farmers to citizens must be based on
the promotion of education level. In this perspective,
urbanization should be driven by farmers themselves
because they are free to choose their own way of life.4.2. Village collective-led suburb development:
Nanhai model
4.2.1. Introduction
Cooperative economy has a deep foundation in China's
countryside after 1970. Agricultural production and
collective-run industry both function well in such an econ-
omy. In the case of Nanhai, cooperative economy was
introduced into land development.Please cite this article as: Dang, S., et al., Land cooperatives as an app
land transfer market. Frontiers of Architectural Research (2016), httpNanhai is a district of Foshan City, and it is located near
Pearl River Delta. It has a population of 2.6 million. With its
location advantage of being adjacent to Hong Kong, Macao,
and Guangzhou, agricultural land is continuously converted
into industrial use.
Confronted with the irresistible temptation of developing
industry, the local government permitted village collectives
to build factory buildings by themselves to attract the
establishment of enterprises. At the time, the local govern-
ment did not have sufﬁcient funds to support land levelling
and infrastructure construction. In 1992, a land-based joint-
stock system was established. The village community
divided the collective-owned assets and land into pieces
as shares that comprised a new joint-stock organization.
The organization rents the land directly to investors or
constructed workshops. The farmers, as shareholders, may
obtain the proﬁt through bonus distribution. This paper
deemed such an approach as village collective-led suburban
development.4.2.2. Rules of beneﬁt distribution and implementation
Under the policy, after paying taxes and fees, covering the
budget deﬁcit, taking 10% as the welfare fund, 51% of the
remaining net income should be preserved as developing
fund, and the other 49% will be distributed as bonus.
According to data of the second Domestic Land Investiga-
tion (2007–2009), Nanhai district owns about 53,166 ha of
construction land, of which 71% (37,700 ha) is owned by the
village collective. Among the collective-owned construction
land, farmers’ homestead land is about 11,333 ha, and
construction for industrial use is about 25,965 ha.
In 2012, the running of construction land created an
income of 3 billion yuan. The distributed proﬁt was about
2.67 billion yuan, and the average was 3516 yuan per
shareholder (Development Research Center of the Stateroach of suburban space construction: Under the reform of Chinese
://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foar.2016.09.002
S. Dang et al.6Council, 2014). The local government also beneﬁtted from
collective-run property management via tax collection.4.2.3. Integrated evaluation of Nanhai model
The Nanhai model demonstrated that development driven
by the village collective and supported by the local govern-
ment beneﬁts both the farmers and government. First, the
model saves the cost of land consolidation commonly
carried out by the government before land transfer, which
makes land rent more competitive than traditional levied
rural land.
However, the Nanhai model is challenged by its defective
organizational structure. As a land management entity, the
economic organization is closely related to village commis-
sion, which is usually dominated by a few village elites. The
decision-making process, including the disposition of
resources, remains unclear. Similar to common collective-
run companies, the property right of Nanhai village eco-
nomics is ambiguous, and the identiﬁcation of shareholders
strictly overlaps with that of community members.
The shareholders of each land pooling cooperatives are
relatively ﬁxed; therefore, the optimal allocation of
resources in a large scale becomes impossible. The homo-
geneous competition of the manufacturing industry within
Nanhai area is serious, and land development is scattered.4.3. Comparison of Huaming and Nanhai models
A comparison of Huaming and Nanhai models is shown in
Table 2. The Huaming model cares more about efﬁciency
but less about social equity, whereas the Nanhai model is
more equitable for farmers but less efﬁcient.
The key factors of land development are capital and
technology. Government-established companies can obtain
bank loans and assign plans easily. Large-scale land devel-
opment is unreasonable for village collective-run compa-
nies, because the cooperative economy units do not merge
and land arrangement only occurs within each village
community.Table 2 Comparison of Huaming and Nanhai models.
Item Huaming mod
Location Suburb of Tia
Time Since 2005
Way of land transfer Permanent tr
Subject of development Govt establis
The role of local govt Developer
Way of Investment Bank loans
Density of development High
Speed of development Fast
Beneﬁt of farmers Lump-sum co
Beneﬁt of local govt Land transac
Existence of cooperative economy before/after Yes/No
Identiﬁcation of natives before/after Rural/Urban
Preservation of agriculture No
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model
5.1. Introduction of Land Cooperative (Land Co-op)
Efﬁcient and sustainable land development in suburban
areas needs a speciﬁc organization. Within the current
structure, the legal representative subject is the Village
Committee. However, as the basic power institution, the
Village Committee is affected by high-level government. In
most occasions, the committee can hardly speak for
farmers.
The separation of administrative and economic functions
is one of the most important contents in the reform of
Chinese village organization. An independent economic
organization is essential in land transfer and other economic
activities.
The Land Co-op mentioned in the title is an organization
that aims to build a compact suburban space on the premise
that farmers keep their land ownership.5.2. Operation mechanism of Land Co-op
Land Co-op is organized by land pooling such that a
voluntary villager can abandon his/her right of free land
development and become a shareholder of Land Co-op.
Shares can be transferred; if one wants to quit, he or she
may obtain an equal amount of land elsewhere.
This concentration of land management right can com-
pensate for the deﬁciency of scattered development and
form an agglomeration effect. The physical right of land is
transformed to nonﬁgurative contractual right through land
pooling, thereby restricting fragmented land transfer
and use.
To address the deﬁciencies of the Nanhai model, the Land
Co-op model emphasizes the division of ownership and
management (Figure 6). Land development is more compli-
cated than traditional economic activities, so Land Co-op
must introduce advanced talent and experience. Further-
more, the diversiﬁcation of investment subjects will be
helpful to solve the ﬁnancing problem of village construction.el Nanhai model
njin City Suburb of Foshan City
Since 1992
ansfer Term lease
hed company Village collective-run company
Policy Maker
Fund raising
Low
Slow
mpensation Corporate dividends
tion fees Taxes
Yes/Yes
household registration Rural/Rural household registration
Yes
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Figure 6 Operation mechanism of Land Co-op.
7Land cooperatives as an approach of suburban space construction: Under the reform of Chinese land transfer marketInvestors can gain the development right through purchase of
stocks. When one speciﬁc investor possesses not less than 51%
of total stocks, he/she can dominate the development.
Different from the old pattern, such a status is under the
supervision of other shareholders. Land Co-op should focus
on land development affairs, so the relationship between
Co-op and collective-run companies is critical.
Land Co-op is a land pooling-based joint stock system.
Land, as a production factor, should withdraw from corpo-
rate economies. Subsequently, Land Co-op may rent out
land to collective-run companies.
In the implementation of land development project, the
manager of Land Co-op and his/her work team will be the
protagonist. First, they must prepare a land use plan and
urban design blue print; such a process should be based on
public participation. The scheme must be approved in the
shareholders’ meeting and pass government review. Second,
the manager should raise funds for infrastructure construc-
tion; the key factor of this step is the discrimination of pure
public good and quasi-public good. With marginal utility, the
pure public good, such as streets and municipal facilities,
should be provided by the government to achieve optimal
resource allocation. The government may pay the cost
through transfer payment or bank loan using tax revenue
as collateral. The ﬁnancial expenditure of the government
can be composed of property tax collection. In the case of
Huaming New Town, the local government uses the proﬁt of
land trading and development for infrastructural invest-
ment, which is inappropriate in terms of public good
provision. Another part of public good is quasi-public good,
which can be provided by both government and social
capital.
For proﬁt distribution based on the Land Co-op model,
the land value increment and operating income will be
partly accounted to the government, management group,
and land owner.
5.3. Social reconstitution of village community
under Land Co-op
This paper considers social reconstitution of village com-
munity as a result of economic organizational relationship
transformation.Please cite this article as: Dang, S., et al., Land cooperatives as an app
land transfer market. Frontiers of Architectural Research (2016), httpThe local knowledge is a set of surviving principles under
a speciﬁc local condition. The reform program attempts to
ensure farmers’ independence and completeness of prop-
erty right, which will gradually transform them into modern
citizens.
In the Land Co-op model, the openness of a personnel
system and ﬁnancing system will create a strong connection
between villages and external environment. Long-term land
development will provide sufﬁcient time for the villagers to
adapt to the modern interpersonal relationship based on a
contract.
5.4. New role of government under Land Co-op
model
5.4.1. Lawmaking and policy support
The effective running of Land Co-op requires clear property
right identiﬁcation and registration, a normative land
transfer market, and popularization of property right knowl-
edge. Consequently, the central government should estab-
lish a set of laws and regulations to guarantee the
implementation of the reform program.
Moreover, the local government should establish a series of
policies that can protect the interest of rural land owners to
encourage spontaneous land development with compactness.
5.4.2. Taxation as regulation measure
Property tax is a promising solution for the local government
to share the increment of land value brought by pure public
good supply after land reform. Property tax can also restrain
low-density development, because the increase in popula-
tion density can lower average tax burden.
Low-density development causes negative external effects.
The government may collect sprawl tax to internalize extern-
alities and control the fragmented land development.
5.4.3. Standard of rural planning in suburban area as
regulation measure
Land Co-op is created for lucrative purposes, and its land use
plan may ignore public interest in a large scale. Therefore, a
standard for rural planning in suburban areas and a related
evaluation system should be established. A developmentroach of suburban space construction: Under the reform of Chinese
://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foar.2016.09.002
S. Dang et al.8project must satisfy the standard requirement and pass
relative evaluation before execution.
6. Conclusion
The current land transfer market system resulted in indus-
trial urban sprawl. The land transfer reform program can
effectively restrain the use of rural land by institutions and
enterprises, but it may promote population urban sprawl.
The Exchange Homestead for House and other similar
policies (represented by the Huaming model) successfully
realized the compact development of a suburban area but
deprived the farmers’ right of sustainable land use. The
land pooling cooperative strategy (represented by the
Nanhai model) successfully ensured the property rights of
farmers but remained inefﬁcient and short-sighted.
The design of Land Co-op is conducive to the reconstitu-
tion of traditional community, economically and socially.
Such a mechanism can possibly avoid population urban
sprawl and build a compact and sustainable suburban space.
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